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Summary 
Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people 
frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale 
cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for 
free-riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, 
including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an 
alternative theoretical proposal: Responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific 
individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases 
cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in 
greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human 
groups and provide further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly 
behave altruistically. 
 
Key terms: Cooperation, free-riding, punishment, altruism, leadership 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a spate of papers providing evidence for various mechanisms 
to coax cooperation out of groups of individuals (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006; Sigmund 
2007). It is to state the obvious that humans can cooperate readily in extraordinary numbers 
(Smirnov et al 2007) and that this cooperation often provides public goods, despite the risk 
of free-riding (Andreoni 1988; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). Much of the recent empirical 
work on the puzzling aspects of human cooperation have focused on testing evolutionary 
models of diffuse or altruistic punishment (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Boyd et al 2003; 
Henrich & Boyd 2001), in which many individuals share the burden of punishing non-
cooperators (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Fehr et al 2002; Sober & 
Wilson 1998).  
 However, since recent work has shown a lack of motivation for costly punishment 
in some otherwise cooperative societies (Henrich et al 2006)--perhaps because the solutions 
have not addressed the problem of second-order free-riding--and a possible taste for 
countervailing anti-social punishment (Hermann et. al. 2008), it seem plausible that 
different mechanisms may stabilize cooperation in different ways in different populations. 
We explore a solution to n-person cooperation in which a designated individual is 
responsible for punishment. Over the course of human evolution individuals in groups 
capable of motivating cooperation would have gained an adaptive advantage. Observed 
hunter-gatherer groups adopt various mechanisms to ensure cooperation, and leadership is 
one such mechanism that both integrates with humanity’s primate heritage and offers a 
mechanism for groups to coordinate activity (Boehm 1999; Brown 1991; Van Vugt, 2006). 
Models in economics (Hirshleifer & Rasmusen 1989) and evolutionary biology (Boyd & 
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Richerson 1992) indicate that evolution can favour a single punisher per social group and 
that the actions of this one punisher can efficiently galvanize group cooperation. This 
solution is particularly interesting since it lacks the second-order free-rider problem--which 
has been the central focus of much theoretical effort--and it  avoids the problem of 
uncoordinated over-punishment.  
 Our experimental findings confirm that (1) when placed in the sole punisher role 
individuals will punish sufficiently to sustain cooperation, (2) others will respond by 
increasing cooperative contributions, and (3) a single punisher can sustain levels of 
cooperation comparable to that maintained by diffuse punishment (Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Ostrom et al 1994; Yamagishi 1986) and at more profitable levels, since punishing efforts 
are not unnecessarily duplicated. Such findings suggest that in the smaller-scale societies 
that have dominated human evolutionary history (as well as in the smaller groups of 
contemporary societies) the single punisher solution may have been an important means of 
maintaining cooperation. In such groups, single punishers may even be a superior 
mechanism, compared to diffuse punishment systems.  
 
2. Methods 
(a) Participants 
 136 participants (35% male) who were undergraduate students from the University 
of Kent at Canterbury were recruited from across the campus by way of a job advertisement 
service. Six experimental sessions took place with 20-24 participants per session. The 
sessions lasted approximately one hour and the average earning for participants was 
UK₤5.47. Each MU earned during the session equated to UK₤.01. 
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(b)  Design and procedure 
 Initially, participants were informed, by way of a projected presentation, of the 
procedure of the experiment (including that assignment to groups was random and occurred 
each round, interactions were anonymous, the amount of endowment, how it could be 
invested, how payoffs were allocated, how they would be paid), examples of different 
contribution patterns and the corresponding payoffs, and the use of the computer software. 
Participants were not informed at the beginning of the first segment that there were two 
segments. After the presentation of the instructions, participants were tested on their 
understanding of the payoff procedure. All participants showed satisfactory comprehension.  
 For those in punishment conditions, further instruction was provided prior to the 
commencement of the second segment while those continuing with a second control 
condition received a brief refresher. Instructions relating to the making of deductions did 
not make any suggestion as to how such deductions could be used, or whether they should 
be used. Participants were simply informed that such deductions would be possible for the 
second segment and it was explained how to make such deductions, should participants 
wish to use such a facility. If a participant queried the purpose, then he or she was simply 
told that it was an option that would be available and it was up to him or here how it could 
be used. 
 We used a modified methodology (Fehr & Gächter 2002) of a public goods 
experiment that had real monetary earnings at stake run on networked PCs using z-Tree 
software (Fischbacher 2007). Participants all completed a two-segment experiment with an 
initial no-punishing control segment followed by a second segment of either a further 
control condition (no-punishment), a condition with punishment permitted for all group 
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members (all-punishment), or a condition with only one individual permitted to punish 
(one-punishment); therefore all participants acted as their own controls and partook in only 
one of three conditions. We did not counterbalance as, firstly, Fehr and Gächter (2002) 
showed that there was no order effect for not-punishing versus punishing and, secondly, our 
focus was on comparison between the two punishment conditions. 
 In all conditions, participants played the same public goods game: Assigned to 
groups of four, participants were allocated an endowment of 20 monetary units (MUs), of 
which they could invest any amount into a group fund and retain the remainder. Each MU 
invested in the group fund yielded a payoff of 0.5MU to each group member, irrespective 
of who invested. That is, each MU invested in the group fund was doubled and then divided 
four ways. Thus, participants would always be better off contributing nothing to the group 
fund as the return was less than the investment. However, if every member invested their 
full endowment, then each member would earn 40 MUs, a profit of 20. 
 Each round, groups were randomly formed so that participants never knew with 
whom they were interacting (“stranger protocol” in the economics literature), thus 
controlling for reputation and reciprocity effects. All interactions were anonymous. 
Investment decisions were made simultaneously, after which information was provided on 
the investments of other group members. In the second-segment punishment conditions, 
individuals could simultaneously make deductions from each other by paying a fee, drawn 
from their earnings for that round, up to a fee maximum of 10 MUs per punished member 
(the deduction was equivalent to three times the fee). For the one-punishment condition, 
one member per group was randomly selected after each investment phase to make 
deductions, whereas in the all-punishment condition, all individuals could make deductions. 
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We conducted the public goods game for six rounds in each condition, so that participants 
played a total of twelve rounds over two segments to avoid one-shot effects and to examine 
participants’ behaviour over a series of games. With each participant acting as his or her 
own control and with a fixed order, we could compare between conditions. 
 During the experiment, participants received no information other than of the 
contributions made by each of the other group members to the group fund and, in the 
punishing conditions after punishing occurred, of the level of deductions made from their 
own account only. Participants were located in a large computer laboratory and were 
spaced apart such that no-one could see another participant’s screen. After completing the 
public goods games, participants completed online and paper questionnaires to assess their 
attitudinal and emotional responses to the experiment and their interactions in the games, 
group identity, and a number of other measures not reported here. 
 
3. Results 
 The average contribution made by participants across all sessions and rounds was 
8.28 MUs (SD=6.55). For analysis, we used Generalized Estimating Equations, available in 
SPSS 15, which utilizes robust (Huber-White) errors to correct for lack of independence in 
the data. Because participants interacted with each other within sessions, this represents a 
conservative approach to analysis (we also performed a non-parametric analysis, which 
yielded qualitatively similar results; however GEE allows for more powerful analysis and is 
what we report here). We present our analysis firstly of the contribution data (segment one 
followed by segment two), then of the profit data and finally of the punishing data. 
3.1 Analysis of contributions 
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 GEEs for the contribution data used a first-order autoregressive working correlation 
matrix, due to correlations between adjacent rounds’ contributions and a normal/identity 
link. The data from segment two of the study concerns our primary hypothesis that the one-
punishment condition would increase contributions above the control condition (see Fig.1 
for mean contributions and 95% confidence intervals for the three conditions over the six 
rounds). We examined the effects of condition, round and sex on contributions. There is a 
main effect on segment two contributions (Wald χ2 = 10.41, d.f. = 2, p = .005). Regression 
values (derived from the GEE model, see Table 1) show that both all-punishment and one-
punishment differ significantly from the control group (all-punishment v control: B = 6.20, 
S.E. = 1.32, p < .001; one-punishment v control: B = 5.47, S.E. = 1.19, p < .001) while all-
punishment and one-punishment do not appear to significantly differ (B = -.73, S.E. = 1.32, 
p = .579; obtained by switching the reference category from control to all-punishment). 
 Additionally, a main effect for round approaches significance (Wald χ2 = 10.74, d.f. 
= 5, p = .057) and there is an interaction between manipulation and rounds (Wald χ2 = 
25.29, d.f. = 10, p = .005), reflecting the decrease in contributions in the no-punishment 
condition in contrast to the more stable contributions in the other two conditions (see 
Fig.1). Contributions in the control condition decreased significantly across the six rounds 
in segment two (rounds regressed on contributions with robust errors, B = -1.08, S.E. = .22, 
p <.001) whereas contributions in the two punishing conditions remained relatively 
constant (all-punishment B = -.12, S.E. = .21, p = .570; one-punishment B = .03; S.E. = .19, 
p = .868). There is no effect for sex, nor is there an interaction (p > .370). Our findings 
support the hypothesis that, under these conditions, a single individual operating as the sole 
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punisher in a group can improve contributions relative to a control condition without 
punishment and matches the effect produced by allowing everyone to punish. 
We should note that there are differences between conditions in contributions (Wald χ2 = 
19.59, d.f. = 2, p < .001), possibly due to participants attending with an understanding of 
the experiment, but these initial differences disappear after the six rounds (round one: Wald 
χ2 = 16.72, d.f. = 2, p < .001; round six: Wald χ2 = 1.80, d.f. = 2, p = .408). However, this 
change is not reflected in a significant interaction (Wald χ2 = 4.68, d.f. = 10, p = .912), 
though there is a main effect for round (Wald χ2 = 33.09, d.f. = 5, p < .001). Finally, there is 
no difference due to sex of participant (Wald χ2 = 2.91, d.f. = 1, p = .088), nor did sex 
interact with either condition or round (p > .711). The lack of a significant difference 
between conditions in round six of segment one suggests that any initial differences in 
contribution levels between conditions had been eliminated by the end of segment one, but 
to control for differences in baseline contribution dispositions, we used participants’ 
average contributions in segment one as a covariate in the analysis of segment two data. 
3.2 Analysis of profits 
 Differences in segment one profits due to condition and round necessarily follow 
contribution differences in the same study segment and so, not surprisingly, are significant 
(condition: Wald χ2 = 25.68, d.f. = 2, p < .001; round: Wald χ2 = 33.68, d.f. = 5, p < .001), 
though there is no effect for sex or interactions. As above, for analysis of the profit data 
from segment two (see Fig.2 for mean profits and 95% confidence intervals), we use 
segment one contributions as a covariate. There is a main effect for condition (Wald χ2 = 
144.79, d.f. = 2, p < .001) and an interaction between condition and round (Wald χ2 = 
42.10, d.f. = 10, p < .001), though no main effects for round or sex, nor are there interaction 
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effects. Regression values (as earlier, derived from the GEE model, see Table 2) show that 
all three conditions differ (all-punishment v control: B = -11.55, S.E. = 2.03, p < .001; one-
punishment v control: B = -5.48, S.E. = 1.79, p = .002; all-punishment v one-punishment: B 
= 6.07, S.E. = 2.32, p = .009; the latter is again obtained by switching the reference 
category from control to all-punishment). 
 The lower mean values for the punishment conditions is primarily due to the cost of 
punishing and to deductions, relative to the control condition. However, it is worth noting 
that, whereas the slopes of the punishment conditions appear stable relative to rounds 
(rounds regressed on contributions with robust errors, all-punishment B = .01, S.E. = .46, p 
= .980; one-punishment B = .21; S.E. = .34, p = .542), the control condition’s slope is not 
(B = -1.08, S.E. = .23, p <.001), suggesting that both punishment conditions would be 
likely to be more profitable than the control condition in the long run. Importantly, the one-
punishment condition has an advantage over the all-punishment condition due to lower total 
costs incurred by group members and this is reflected in its higher profit levels (see Fig.2). 
3.3 Analysis of punishment 
 Looking at punishing, overall participants in the all-punishment condition punished 
on 38.9% of opportunities to do so whereas punishers in the one-punishment condition did 
so on 56.6% of opportunities. Per round, the proportion of participants who punished in the 
one-punishment condition (i.e., punished at least once) was greater than the proportion in 
the all-punishment condition (see Fig.3a). Fewer participants were punished in the one-
punishment condition (Fig.3b) but that condition’s punishers made greater deductions 
(Fig.3c), although the total incurred punishments were not consistently harsher in either 
condition (Fig.3d). 
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 When we examined possible factors that affected punishment behaviour, we found 
that punishers in the all-punishment condition and the one-punishment condition appear to 
be influenced by different factors. Using a GEE approach (using a gamma/log link, due to 
the positively skewed data), we examined separately for the two punishment conditions the 
relationship of punishment levels with the contribution of potential punishers and targets, 
deviations from group and session means by targets, and rounds. Results for the three 
different measures of targets’ contributions are similar, due to these measures being highly 
correlated (r’s > .90). Thus, we focus here on our analysis for actual contributions, as that 
analysis produced the (marginally) stronger results. Examining the all-punishment 
condition first (see Table 3 for GEE regression parameter estimates), we found that higher 
punishments resulted from lower contributions by the target (B = -.03, S.E. = .01, p < .001), 
as might be expected, but, when we added the interaction between the sender’s and target’s 
contributions, then the target’s contributions are no longer significant but both the sender’s 
contribution (B = .03, S.E. = .01, p = .008) and the interaction are significant (B = -.005, 
S.E. = .001, p < .001). In contrast, adding the interaction term in the one-punishment 
condition results in no significant predictors. Without the interaction term, the target’s 
contribution is a significant predictor (B = -.02, S.E. = .01, p < .033).  
Thus, it appears that while participants in diffuse punishment situations attend to both their 
own contribution and that of the target, perhaps using their own contributions to guide their 
decision on whether to punish, those in the solitary punisher condition attend only to the 
contributions of the target, possibly focussed solely on whether contributions are maximally 
beneficial for the group, in which case any deviation from a full contribution represents an 
undesirable shortfall. Fig.4 shows that for both punishment conditions, lower target 
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contributions are associated with higher punishment, though this pattern is clearer for those 
in the all-punishment condition (panel a). 
4. Discussion 
 Individual contributions were significantly higher when punishment was available 
as an option, with participants responding as effectively to a single individual as to all 
group members making deductions. Our results suggest that a single-punisher successfully 
enhances and stabilizes group contributions, while doing so more profitably than in the all-
punishment condition. As punishment costs are lost to the system, punishments by a single 
punisher are more coordinated and thus reduce inefficient losses. It is important to note that 
the success of punishing in this study (in either punishment condition) is facilitated by the 
1:3 ratio of the cost of punishing for the punisher to the cost for the target. While this is a 
common ratio in this methodology, studies have shown that lower ratios tend to not 
produce punishing behaviour sufficient to sustain cooperation (Burnham & Johnson 2005; 
Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Yamagishi 1986). However, we do not view this as an 
unnecessary stumbling block. Asymmetrical impacts of punishment can be readily achieved 
in the real world, for example, through the use of a weapon or social support. 
 The pattern of punishment for contribution levels suggests that lower contributions 
tend to incur greater levels of punishment. As Carpenter and Matthews (2008) argue, it 
appears that punishers are more focussed on actual contribution levels rather than 
deviations from the group (or session) mean, per se. However, actual strategies in 
anonymous games inevitably are likely to be complex, reflecting the fact that individuals 
vary in their cooperative intent (Van Lange 1999) and thus how they respond to both being 
able to ‘punish’ and being ‘punished’. Further in-depth examination of participants 
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strategies, motives and goals is needed. Somewhat unexpectedly, more participants in the 
one-punishment condition punished more often and more harshly than in the all-
punishment condition, incurring greater personal costs. This finding supports the claim for 
an evolved altruistic proclivity in humans to punish free-riders to the benefit of the group in 
the absence of reputation enhancement (Fehr & Gächter 2002). That individuals punished 
knowing that they were anonymous and, when in the one-punishment condition, the sole 
potential punisher, questions the notion that humans do not altruistically punish. Humans 
should be evolved to determine how costly actions might impact their reputation. It is also 
possible that diffusion of responsibility was reduced by having a sole punisher (Latané & 
Darley 1970), though anonymity and costs mean that this cannot solely explain the 
behaviour. 
 These findings may have an important implication for the study of cooperation and 
the functions of leadership in humans. As noted earlier, large scale cooperation in human 
groups (beyond the hunter-gather level) represents an evolutionary puzzle. Diffuse 
punishment does not fully solve this issue because of the iterated problem of second-order 
free-riders. A system with a single designated punisher can potentially avoid this problem 
because there is clearer accountability. In human groups, leaders often fulfil the role of 
designated punishers (Diamond 1997; Heizer 1978; Krackle 1978). Moreover, some form 
of leadership, even if only ephemeral (Johnson & Earle 2000; Steward 1938), is a human 
universal and readily emerges in ad-hoc laboratory groups (Van Vugt 2006). 
 Of course, such a leadership role is potentially costly to the individual who occupies 
it. There is both the energy budget of punishing, and the incumbent costs of self-defence by 
the target or retaliation. Why would individuals take on this role? There may be 
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compensatory benefits for acting as a leader. Some individuals more readily fulfil this role 
than others based on heritable differences in personality (Hogan et al 1994). In human 
societies, leaders acquire status and prestige (Van Vugt 2006), which may translate into 
increased reproductive success (Fieder et al 2005; Henrich & Gil-White 2001). 
Alternatively, group-level selection could facilitate leadership emergence, either by genetic 
or cultural mechanisms (Richerson & Boyd 2004; Sober & Wilson 1998). Groups often 
favour altruists for the leader role (Hardy & Van Vugt 2006; Milinski et al 2002). 
Competition between rival groups results in selective pressure for its adoption culturally or 
its evolution, genetically. If all participants can punish each other, such situations risk 
deteriorating into retaliatory actions that do not just reduce benefits from joint activities but 
damage the integrity of the group (Denant-Boemont et al 2007; Nikiforakis 2008). A 
designated punisher avoids these risks. 
 The issue of anonymity and the consequential inability of punished individuals to 
retaliate represent a constraint on our argument that we provide evidence for leadership to 
function as a constraint on free-riding. If retaliation were possible, a single punishing 
individual would be less costly to retaliate against than a set of punishers. However, in this 
study, we seek only to demonstrate that leadership could fulfil such a function successfully. 
In reality, a leader is not just one individual but represents the pinnacle of a social structure. 
Thus, although responsibility may lie with one individual to act, such actions nonetheless, 
by virtue of the role, carry the support of the group, or at least a majority. Additionally, the 
actual form of punishment varies substantially, and indeed a leader may not need to be the 
individual to actually impose the punishment, as immortalized by Tony Soprano and as is 
very familiar to anyone working in an institution that has punishment capabilities. 
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 In the present study, the random selection of punishers in the one-punishment 
condition served as a means to impose the role on individuals to control for other 
confounds. Nonetheless, future studies would do well to attend to more realistic exploration 
of the role of leaders as punishers. One interesting follow-up would be to examine a series 
of experimental rounds, allowing participants either to experience different regimes (no 
punishing, diffuse punishing, single punisher) or gain information on the performance of 
different regimes, and choose which system to play under. This could further demonstrate 
the willingness (or not) of individuals to operate under a designated punisher (leader) 
system. Related, research documenting cross-cultural variation in costly punishing (Henrich 
et al 2006) suggests our findings may be constrained and it would be worthwhile to 
consider whether punishing through leadership is a cultural universal. The potential impact 
of retailiation also warrants consideration. 
 In smaller-scale human societies prestigious leaders can galvanize the trace of 
larger-scale cooperation (Johnson 2003). At least in some circumstances, individuals 
respond as effectively to a single punishing individual as they do to a more general punitive 
environment without obvious negative reactions. Consistent with existing theoretical work 
(Boyd & Richerson 1992), our research suggests that human psychology may have evolved 
to recognize situations in which a single motivated leader can enforce cooperation (Van 
Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser 2008).  
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Table 1. GEE parameter estimates for regression of contribution levels on punishment 
condition, sex and round in study segment 2. Step 1 consists of entering the main factors, 
step 2 introduces interaction terms. Reference categories were the control condition, round 
6 and female. 
Parameter B Std. Error Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
Step 1     
Intercept .689 1.0917 .398 .528 
All-punishment 2.846 .8454 11.338 .001 
One-punishment 2.107 .7435 8.031 .005 
Round 1 1.824 .6897 6.991 .008 
Round 2 1.875 .6013 9.724 .002 
Round 3 1.434 .5867 5.972 .015 
Round 4 .824 .5541 2.209 .137 
Round 5 .324 .5763 .315 .575 
Sex .624 .7447 .701 .402 
Seg1 mean contrib. .527 .1008 27.356 .000 
Step 2     
Intercept -1.814 1.2846 1.994 .158 
All-pun 6.204 1.3195 22.106 .000 
One-pun 5.469 1.1918 21.060 .000 
Round 1 6.271 1.3581 21.324 .000 
Round 2 5.208 1.3078 15.856 .000 
Round 3 4.551 1.2976 12.299 .000 
Round 4 2.176 1.0505 4.291 .038 
Round 5 2.283 1.2562 3.302 .069 
Sex 1.905 1.4251 1.786 .181 
Seg1 mean contrib. .526 .1004 27.442 .000 
All-pun * Round 1 -5.971 1.7085 12.216 .000 
All-pun * Round 2 -4.502 1.4073 10.233 .001 
All-pun * Round 3 -3.653 1.3486 7.338 .007 
All-pun * Round 4 -2.555 1.2618 4.100 .043 
All-pun * Round 5 -3.261 1.3781 5.599 .018 
One-pun * Round 1 -6.027 1.5423 15.272 .000 
One-pun * Round 2 -4.927 1.5063 10.699 .001 
One-pun * Round 3 -3.678 1.5370 5.726 .017 
One-pun * Round 4 -1.604 1.4033 1.306 .253 
One-pun * Round 5 -1.796 1.4854 1.462 .227 
All-pun * Sex -.176 1.7709 .010 .921 
One-pun * Sex -1.281 1.7622 .529 .467 
Round 1 * Sex -1.638 1.4548 1.267 .260 
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Round 2 * Sex -.817 1.1526 .502 .478 
Round 3 * Sex -2.156 1.1448 3.547 .060 
Round 4 * Sex -.020 1.1253 .000 .985 
Round 5 * Sex -.935 1.1631 .646 .421 
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Table 2. GEE parameter estimates for regression of profit levels on punishment condition, 
sex and round in study segment 2. Step 1 consists of entering the main factors, step 2 
introduces interaction terms. Reference categories were the control condition, round 6 and 
female. 
Parameter B Std. Error Wald Chi-Square Sig. 
Step 1     
Intercept 30.003 1.4460 430.500 .000 
All-punishment -14.409 1.2864 125.468 .000 
One-punishment -7.608 .8449 81.078 .000 
Round 1 1.371 1.0850 1.597 .206 
Round 2 2.507 1.1470 4.779 .029 
Round 3 1.287 1.1432 1.267 .260 
Round 4 1.129 .9420 1.436 .231 
Round 5 1.217 1.0409 1.367 .242 
Sex -1.429 .9536 2.247 .134 
Seg1 mean contrib. -.318 .1086 8.589 .003 
Step 2     
Intercept 28.498 1.5377 343.479 .000 
All-punishment -11.553 2.0340 32.263 .000 
One-punishment -5.482 1.7864 9.417 .002 
Round 1 5.023 1.4999 11.215 .001 
Round 2 5.166 1.6530 9.769 .002 
Round 3 3.039 1.5904 3.652 .056 
Round 4 2.700 1.2898 4.381 .036 
Round 5 1.420 1.4711 .932 .334 
Sex -1.945 1.7971 1.171 .279 
Seg1 mean contrib. -.320 .1083 8.708 .003 
All-pun * Round 1 -9.657 2.5962 13.835 .000 
All-pun * Round 2 -.811 2.6926 .091 .763 
All-pun * Round 3 -1.466 2.7361 .287 .592 
All-pun * Round 4 -1.243 2.0978 .351 .554 
All-pun * Round 5 -4.287 2.5091 2.919 .088 
One-pun * Round 1 -2.791 2.2027 1.605 .205 
One-pun * Round 2 -6.631 2.5952 6.530 .011 
One-pun * Round 3 -5.171 2.4557 4.433 .035 
One-pun * Round 4 -2.371 2.2098 1.151 .283 
One-pun * Round 5 2.648 2.2341 1.404 .236 
All-pun * Sex .359 2.3883 .023 .881 
One-pun * Sex .639 1.8383 .121 .728 
Round 1 * Sex 1.086 2.2925 .224 .636 
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Round 2 * Sex -.727 2.5144 .084 .773 
Round 3 * Sex 1.141 2.3496 .236 .627 
Round 4 * Sex -1.163 1.9170 .368 .544 
Round 5 * Sex .947 2.2605 .176 .675 
 
Solitary punishers constrain free-riding  
 
24 
 
Table 3. GEE parameter estimates for regression of imposed punishment on sender’s and 
target’s contributions and round in study segment 2. Round 6 was the reference category 
for the round factor. 
 All-punishment  One-punishment 
Parameter B Std. Error 
Wald Chi-
Square Sig. 
 B Std. Error 
Wald Chi-
Square Sig. 
Step 1          
Intercept 1.102 .1457 57.243 .000  .696 .2089 11.113 .001 
Sender’s contrib. -.002 .0111 .023 .880  -.003 .0086 .104 .747 
Target’s contrib. -.033 .0093 12.372 .000  -.017 .0079 4.556 .033 
Round 1 .126 .1185 1.129 .288  -.139 .1342 1.072 .301 
Round 2 -.144 .1444 .989 .320  .111 .2443 .208 .649 
Round 3 -.072 .1485 .233 .629  .143 .2434 .345 .557 
Round 4 -.109 .0974 1.245 .265  .049 .2398 .041 .839 
Round 5 .049 .1445 .113 .737  -.166 .2139 .601 .438 
Step 2             
Intercept .799 .1659 23.205 .000  .680 .2232 9.279 .002 
Sender’s contrib. .033 .0124 6.971 .008  -.001 .0130 .005 .942 
Target’s contrib. .002 .0112 .032 .859  -.015 .0126 1.421 .233 
Round 1 .131 .1130 1.336 .248  -.139 .1338 1.085 .298 
Round 2 -.121 .1320 .841 .359  .113 .2436 .214 .644 
Round 3 -.071 .1267 .316 .574  .143 .2430 .347 .556 
Round 4 -.113 .0913 1.530 .216  .049 .2397 .042 .837 
Round 5 .079 .1406 .312 .576  -.167 .2136 .610 .435 
Sender’s contrib. * 
Target’s contrib. -.005 .0011 15.829 .000 
 .000 .0010 .052 .820 
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Figure legends 
 
Fig.1. Mean contributions of MUs to the group fund by participants in segment two with 
95% confidence intervals indicated by error bars.  
Fig.2. Mean profits (MUs) for participants in segment two with 95% confidence intervals 
indicated by error bars. 
Fig. 3. There were more punishers in the one-punishment condition who punished at least 
once per round than in the all-punishment condition (a), although punishers in the one-
punishment condition did not punish as many group members (b). One-punishment 
punishers did, however, expend greater resources to punish (c), resulting in a similar level 
of penalties being incurred within each punishment condition when considered over the six 
rounds in Segment Two (d).  
Fig. 4. Punishers tended to apply greater deductions for values that deviated more from 
higher levels of possible contributions, though this effect is stronger in the all-punishment 
(a) than in the one-punishment condition (b). 
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